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Most audit tooling asks a reviewer to trust the vendor. Sanning is built so that nobody has to. Sanning is never in the trust path. Verification runs against an open-source kernel, offline, on the recipient’s machine. If Sanning is unreachable, or gone, evidence already handed over still checks out. This page is the argument for that claim, and its limits.

What we could do wrong, and why it would not matter

Take the adversarial view. Assume Sanning is careless, compromised, or hostile. The one thing Sanning holds that matters is the witness: the published commitment that a set of records existed by a time. That lives on a public record, not with us, which is the point.

What you hold

You hold the signing key and the raw data. That means two things. Nobody can produce evidence as you. Not Sanning, not a counterparty, not us under subpoena. Nobody can reconstruct your evidence for you. Sanning holds commitments, so if you lose your log store, the commitments stand and the bytes behind them are gone. This is why the SDK writes to your store before anchoring, and why a store failure stops the anchor.

What the control plane is, and is not

The control plane at console.sanning.io handles issuance, the roster, metering and billing. It is not in the trust path. It can refuse to accept a record. It cannot make an invalid record verify, and it cannot make a valid one fail. Verification never consults the roster: the kernel checks a signature against a key embedded in the artifact. Producer identity informs, never gates. Knowing which agent signed is useful. It is not what makes the evidence sound.

The limits, stated plainly

Content-blind means we cannot vouch for your content. Sanning records that a commitment existed at a time and that it has not changed since. Whether the thing recorded was true, correct, or complete is not ours to say. Your auditors reach conclusions; Sanning provides evidence they can check. A pack does not prove completeness. It proves what it carries. See What a verdict means. Tamper-evident, not tamper-proof. Nothing here stops anyone changing a file they hold. It makes the change visible to anyone who checks.