What we could do wrong, and why it would not matter
Take the adversarial view. Assume Sanning is careless, compromised, or hostile.
The one thing Sanning holds that matters is the witness: the published commitment that
a set of records existed by a time. That lives on a public record, not with us, which is
the point.
What you hold
You hold the signing key and the raw data. That means two things. Nobody can produce evidence as you. Not Sanning, not a counterparty, not us under subpoena. Nobody can reconstruct your evidence for you. Sanning holds commitments, so if you lose your log store, the commitments stand and the bytes behind them are gone. This is why the SDK writes to your store before anchoring, and why a store failure stops the anchor.What the control plane is, and is not
The control plane atconsole.sanning.io handles issuance, the roster, metering and
billing.
It is not in the trust path. It can refuse to accept a record. It cannot make an
invalid record verify, and it cannot make a valid one fail. Verification never consults
the roster: the kernel checks a signature against a key embedded in the artifact.
Producer identity informs, never gates. Knowing which agent signed is useful. It is not
what makes the evidence sound.